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What is at stake in writing – and critically reading – a history of  post-Zionism?
The highly contemporary nature of  the subject matter – at its core it is an intel-
lectual history of  an ideological mood among certain Israeli elites during the
1990s – makes every pretense of  retrospect almost too tentative to be taken seri-
ously. The evident fleeting of  that mood, and the bitter understanding that this
apparently was all that it ever was – a fleeting mood – tempts one to wonder if
the subject at all merits this kind of  attention. If  it does, it surely requires a
detailed explanation of  its wider significance – the general phenomena illustrated
by it.
Attempts to analyze and narrate the rise and (at least for now) fall of
post-Zionism are of  interest to historians because post-Zionism has been first
and foremost a historiographical phenomenon. The post-Zionists debates accen-
tuate tensions between academic historiography and collective memory; the
mutual dependency of  political ideologies and historiography; the uses and abus-
es of  history in the public sphere; and more specifically the benefits and costs of
genuine public interest in historiographical debates. Post-Zionism nicely show-
cases how history writing and rewriting are implicated in political circumstances
and ideological reconfigurations. 
In April 1998, the Economist titled a special supplement marking fifty
years for the establishment of  Israel, “After Zionism.”1 And at the time, this
seemed to be where things were headed. Indeed, as far as the Economist’s unfal-
tering liberal point of  view was concerned, this was where things should have
gone. The argument being that Zionism had done its job – the Zionist enterprise
(to literally translate the Hebrew expression) had gloriously succeeded in estab-
lishing a prosperous Jewish nation state. By its fiftieth anniversary however, it
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seemed that if  Israel was to continue flourishing – transcending all the obstacles
and threats that still lied ahead – Zionism must give way to a new ideological
configuration. And as is usually the case on the pages of  the Economist, this argu-
ment was both prescriptive and descriptive – this was not only what should hap-
pen but also what was already, unavoidably, happening.
The idea that Zionism was good – or at least suitable or beneficial – for
its time, but no longer, meaningfully transcends the century old opposition
between Zionist and anti-Zionists. Neither eternally cheering for the Zionist
cause nor categorically resisting it, post-Zionism tried to open a previously unar-
ticulated third option or horizon of  options. There was of  course an entire spec-
trum of  ways and means to do that. Some post-Zionists, in a way similar to the
position expressed by the Economist, adopted a “two cheers” understanding of
Zionism and its accomplishments, calling for a mature (yet also rejuvenating)
soul searching process – confronting past injustices and wrongdoings so as to
build a more inclusive and just Israeli society. 
Others preferred a more defamatory interpretation of  Zionist history,
understanding it as colonial in nature, oppressive, discriminatory and dispossess-
ing in conduct. Yet unlike classic anti-Zionism, understanding what Zionism real-
ly was, was understood as an enlightening reconsideration, made possible by a
new historical constellation. Arguably, it was previously impossible for Jewish
Israelis to see Zionism for what it really was. 
What was that new historical constellation? On the intellectual academ-
ic plain it was Lyotard’s postmodern condition; Habermas’ post-national constel-
lation; or Rorty’s celebration of  irony, contingency and solidarity.2 On the politi-
cal-economic plain there was a complex constellation of  institutional restructur-
ing, regulatory reforms and technological innovations termed at the time global-
ization. On the geopolitical plain the cold war ended and locally, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and with it and through it the wider Jewish-Arab conflict
seemed on the verge of  a peaceful solution.
By the first decade of  the new century, things begun to fall apart.
Maintaining an incredulous stance toward all ideologies did not prove itself  as
liberating and creative as hoped for. At the same time the widening inequalities
and new strategies of  global exploitation and dispossession made globalization
more controversial and questionable (though no less triumphant in terms of  its
continuous expansion and entrenchment). The high hopes for the coming peace
were shattered with the eruption of  the second Intifada in response to Israel’s
incessant expansion of  Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Israel’s wars with
the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas in Gaza soon followed. It is in this
regard all too tempting to collapse the intellectual history of  the post-Zionist
moment into yet another attempt at explaining, or at least ascribing blame for,
the collapse of  the Oslo process. 
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I begin this review article by anecdotally suggesting the similarities
between the post-Zionist moment in Israel and the demise of  Afrikaner nation-
alism in South Africa, only a few years before the process begun in Israel. While
the three books reviewed do not attempt to place and interpret post-Zionism in
a comparative framework, I suggest that only by abstracting the history of  the
post-Zionist mood from its Israeli context and rephrasing it in general terms,
would we be able to understand it and the meaning of  its regrettable trajectory.
It is, I believe, what is at stake when writing a history of  post-Zionism, as
oppose to merely reducing it to an epiphenomenon of  the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. 
In the second part of  the article I outline the various kinds of  post-
Zionist scholarship as read in the three reviewed studies. In the third part of  the
article I turn to the problem of  neo-Zionism, questioning the way this latest ide-
ological turn in Israel is understood by Uri Ram and Ilan Pappe, suggesting that
it might be better for the purpose of  an intellectual history of  post-Zionism to
understand neo-Zionism as part of  the post-Zionist phenomenon. 
The Lynching of  Van Jaarsveld
On March 28, 1979, at the senate hall of  the University of  South Africa
(UNISA) in the city of  Potchefstroom, the prominent Afrikaner historian,
Professor Floors Van Jaarsveld from Pretoria University, delivered a public talk.
He challenged the celebration of  the ‘Day of  the Vow’. A day held sacrosanct by
Afrikaner nationalism in commemoration of  the 1838 “Battle of  Blood River.”
Where, 471 Voortrekkers, the pioneering forefathers of  the Afrikaner nation,
miraculously (as the official version at the time held) decimated the Zulu forces,
killing more than 3000 warriors. 
Jaarsveld questioned the morality of  forcing a day of  man-made
Sabbath on all the populations in South Africa. The majority of  which trivially
identify with those defeated. If  not morally wrong it was politically imprudent.
He pointed out that the day was only sanctified five decades after the event itself.
But above all, Jaarsveld hinted that divine intervention might have been more
indirect than is commonly assumed, given that the Voortrekkers had a canon at
their disposal.3
Jaarsveld debunked the Afrikaner national myth of  Blood River. As he
saw it, a rather mundane clash between unequal forces on the colonial frontier
was reframed as a biblical scene: the Voortrekkers being the people of  Israel and
the Zulus one of  the peoples of  Canaan. While he was lecturing, forty-seven
thugs in suits marched into the hall. The men, all members of  the AWB
(Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging: Afrikaner Resistance Movement), a radical sepa-
ratist movement, unceremoniously climbed to the stage and begun pouring tar
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and feathers over the shocked and silent Jaarsveld.4
The lynching of  Jaarsveld won the AWB the public attention they were
seeking. While the government condemned the violent nature of  the act, main-
stream Afrikaners deemed the allegedly healthy, patriotic sentiment behind it,
understandable if  not salutary. This public display of  popular rage against
Jaarsveld’s iconoclastic scholarship led to the removal of  Jaarsveld’s history text-
books from the school system’s curriculum and to major publishers turning their
backs on him as well as taking his previous books off  the shelves. 
A decade and a half  later, however, Jaarsveld’s views became common-
place, among most Afrikaner populations. “The day of  the vow,” was remade in
1994 into the “day of  reconciliation.” Afrikaner nationalism became all but
extinct,5 and its historiography rejected as the outdated ideology of  an infamous
regime. For example, 2002 marked a hundred years to the South African war of
1899-1902, which under its previous name, the Anglo-Boer war, functioned as a
constitutive national trauma in Afrikaner collective memory. The retelling of  the
story of  the war, reviving in it the interlocking stories of  all the populations of
South Africa – first and foremost the story of  the black concentration camps –
exemplifies the dissolution of  Afrikaner nationalism into the nation building
process of  the new South African nation.6
This abrupt ideological transformation has been recently suggested as a
new foundational myth for a new and post-national configuration of  Afrikaner
identity, Afrikaans political ethnicity.7 Supposedly, Afrikaners have been excep-
tional in their collective willingness to renounce their previously-held-as-sacred
national history and begin a torturous process of  writing an essentially contested
new national history.8 Afrikaner nationalism has, according to those so arguing,
proved unique in its ability to voluntarily, without being defeated in any narrow
sense of  the word, dissolve into a new nation-building project.9
The project of  reconciling the new South African nation in itself
speaks in terms of  the “South African miracle” in reference to the ideological
transformation of  South Africa. This, however, is merely an expression of  the
construction of  a new foundational myth for what is at the end of  the day a new
nation. The aforementioned self-congratulatory claims of  those currently advo-
cating the resurrection of  an Afrikaans political ethnicity, are also nothing but
myth making gestures. The peaceful dismantling of  Afrikaner nationalism in the
context of  the democratization of  South Africa in the early 1990s cannot be
productively explained by reference to an alleged exceptionality of  the
Afrikaners, or divine miracle making for that matter. 
Some students of  the democratization of  South Africa, have identified
two distinct phases in the democratization of  South Africa. The first, consisting
of  de-nationalization which was then followed by a second phase of  re-national-
ization. Both processes were not only ideological, but in fact first and foremost
institutional and economic, i.e. a vast privatization of  state assets and services 
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that was then followed by a rebuilding of  the state as, once again, the main
employer, income provider and allocator of  resources.10
It is the process of  de-nationalization, abstracted from the peculiarities
of  the South African historical circumstances that may best serve us as a theoret-
ical framework for a comparative and critical understanding of  post-Zionism. It
is, I believe, what post-Zionism has been – an attempt at a de-nationalization of
Israeli society. As in South Africa, it was also soon followed by a re-nationaliza-
tion. Albeit, not of  the kind hoped for – in some of  the cases envisioned – by
post-Zionists writers. 
The re-nationalization of  South Africa, was also, though not at all a res-
urrection of  Afrikaner nationalism, a disappointment as far as many South
African intellectuals are concerned. They are critical of  what they believe is an
African nationalism from which whites, Indians, coloureds and interracials are
(mostly informally) excluded in different ways and to various degrees. De-nation-
alization, though defamatory and negative in nature is in fact a hopeful, almost
euphoric phase. Re-nationalization is hence the unavoidably disappointing and
frustrating scaling back of  hopes. This said, in the same way as de-nationaliza-
tions vary so do re-nationalizations – some far more disappointing then others. 
Interestingly, the theoretical and comparative study of  nationalism, has
so far dedicated far greater attention to Zionism and its loud discontents than to
the uncommon historical trajectory of  Afrikaner nationalism. Some comparative
analyses of  those two national movements have been published over the years,
mostly in the context of  the application of  the apartheid paradigm to Israel-
Palestine.11 However, so far the demise of  Afrikaner nationalism and post-
Zionism have not been comparatively studied. 
In more general terms, we usually ask more about how nationalisms are
born and mature, then about how some nationalisms happen to perish. While
the field of  genocide studies (in itself  intimately connected with post-Zionism)
asks: “how nations die?” and even: “how do nations die even when their mem-
bers do not physically die?”12 So far we have not properly asked: How do
nationalism die? Given the intensity of  the classic debate between those who
stress the endurance and longevity of  nations and those for whom nationalism is
a rather recent and (as such presumably) a fleeting phenomenon,13 it is surpris-
ing how little attention has been so far given to the few cases in which nation-
alisms have indeed found their way to history’s recycle bin.
The Space Clearing Gesture 
In 1995, the historian Ilan Pappe, wrote that the post-Zionist debate: “reflects
not only an academic dispute, but also an identity crisis of  a society that stands
on the threshold of  a period of  peace, in which the national consensus, 
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previously built upon threats to survival and security problems, clears a space for
a debate across the society and its culture” (Silberstein, 2). 
Laurence J. Silberstein, a professor of  Jewish studies, quoted Pappe in
the introduction to his 1999 book, The Post Zionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in
Israeli Culture. Writing at what in retrospect is said to be the zenith of  the post-
Zionist moment, Silberstein approvingly identifies in Pappe’s quote the philoso-
pher Kwame Anthony Appiah’s concept of  “a space clearing gesture,”14 suggest-
ing that post-Zionism is “clearing space for previously silenced voices and for
alternatives to the dominant Zionist discourse” (Silberstein, 4). 
However, though Silberstein describes the post-Zionists as engaged in a
space clearing gesture, in Pappe’s quote, it is actually the national consensus that
is clearing the space, not the post-Zionists. They, according to Pappe, are
engaged in the debate made possible by the clearing of  the space. This of  course
would hardly merit attention, if  the national consensus did not begin to close the
space, it was formerly clearing, about a year after the publication of  Silberstein’s
book. 
Silberstein’s book, the seminal English language monograph about
post-Zionism until the publication of  the sociologist Uri Ram’s 2011 book, Israeli
Nationalism: Social Conflicts and the Politics of  Knowledge, well documents the smug
spirit of  post-Zionism between the years 1994 and 2000. Silberstein’s misreading
with regard to who exactly was clearing the space was, I believe, not merely coin-
cidental. Rather, it is symptomatic of  the way many post-Zionists were tempted
at the time to forget or disregard the fleeting conditions enabling their enter-
prise.15
Leaving the question of  who was at the end of  the day the author of
the space clearing gesture, aside for the time being, what substantially was that
gesture, i.e. what was post-Zionism? Ram identifies four distinct perspectives or
frameworks in which post Zionists have understood post-Zionism. Though he,
for some reason, insists on labeling them all with names that start with the prefix
“post”: post-ideological post-Zionism; post-Marxist post-Zionism; postmodern
post-Zionism and postcolonial post-Zionism, the typology in itself  is a useful
way of  mapping the phenomenon.
The first one being the post-ideological tradition, in which the family of
forms Zionism assumed since the late nineteenth century and up until the 1970s
is seen as characteristic of  the nation-building phase of  emerging states.
According to this approach, post-Zionism is merely a normal transition to the
kind of  inclusive, civic, and banal nationalism, characteristic of  mature liberal
states. Arguably, mature conventional expressions of  peoplehood, can and in fact
should entertain revisionist accounts of  their respective national myths, as well as
work-through previously silenced and denied episodes of  wrongdoing and
inequity. 
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Silberstein’s “space clearing gesture” consist in this case of  letting go of
a rigid and idealized conception of  the nation and its history. This conception is,
gradually and by means of  a calm and informed public debate, replaced by a
well-rounded understanding of  the nation as truly a “nation among nations,” and
as such, equally imperfect. The nation, however, is also well capable of  owning
up to its past transgressions. This process of  unearthing embarrassing chapters
in the nation’s history; negotiating the nation’s identity by means of  apologies
and compensations; and practicing meaningful reconciliation, is imagined as a
process of  maturation. As such it is imagined in the end of  the day as affirma-
tive and self-asserting.
This is a thoroughly liberal understanding of  post-Zionism, premised
on the ideals of  universal human rights and an international rule of  law.16 It
evokes Mazzini’s ideal of  the nation as the intermediary entity through which
individuals take part in the greater whole of  humanity.17 Assuming nationalism
as essentially benign, it aims to combat the malignant and predatory excesses of
nationalism, which are understood and excused as “growing pains” – the forgiv-
able diseases of  the infancy of  nations. 
A second post-Zionist framework Ram terms, “post Marxist.” It under-
stands post-Zionism as symptomatic of  the macro-level social and economic
transformations Israel has undergone since the 1980s – the various new forms
of  organizing production and the markets, commonly termed globalization.
According to Ram: 
This transition disrupts the balance of  power between capital labor and
state which prevailed in the corporatist (Fordist) state, and it ushers in
an unbalanced power structure under capital tutelage. Two “non-eco-
nomic” results of  this major shift of  the social regime are the rise of
inequality in the distribution of  income; and a trend of  fragmentation
of  the population into identity groups (Ram, 135).
As opposed to the post-ideological variety of  post-Zionism, this frame-
work does not suggest post-Zionism to be a positive manifestation of  progress
or maturation. It is no wonder in this regard that this approach also informs the
Zionist historian Daniel Gutwein. Gutwein has been habitually deploring post-
Zionism as the privatization of  collective memory and identity and as such an
accomplice in the destruction of  the Zionist developmental welfare state.18 Post-
Marxist post-Zionists, to use Ram’s terminology, argue that Gutwein disregard
the fact that the Zionist developmental welfare state was never universal but only
a Jewish developmental welfare state, was primarily benefitting Jewish popula-
tions. Beyond the discriminatory nature of  the Zionist developmental welfare
state, critics of  Gutwein point out the uncompensated nationalization of
Palestinian property after 1948 (and again though in a different way after 1967)
as well as the exploitation of  Palestinian labour from the west bank and the
Gaza strip until 1991.
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In the case of  Ram’s post-Marxist post-Zionism, it is the restructuring
of  the economy that is responsible for Silberstein’s space clearing gesture.
Zionist ideology and rhetoric became identified with the national labour union,
the national industries and in general with state interference in the economy.
Both were depicted as outdated, corrupt, inefficient and grotesque. The sets of
beliefs underpinning both Zionist ideology and the corporatist state were
exposed as embarrassing fabrications. Above all, it was argued that the inefficien-
cies of  the colossus public sector, just like the childish fairy tales of  Zionism, are
dangerously unsustainable – a precarious illusion on the verge of  bursting,
regardless of  how fond of  it people might personally be. 
Ram terms a third post-Zionist framework, “postmodern.” Post-
Zionism is not, according to this approach, a banal – and benign – symptom of
maturation, but a productive incredulity towards the Zionist meta-narrative. It is
a specific case of  an assumed generalized disbelief  in modernity’s meta-narra-
tives – Lyotard’s postmodernist condition. The intellectual work performed
under the banner of  post-Zionism aims in this case to locally liberate multitudes
of  identities and identification practices from the exclusionary, essentialising and
homogenising effects of  Zionism.
Though this is only one variation of  post-Zionism, and the one least
characteristic of  post-Zionist historians, it is the one most commonly identified
with the phenomenon as a whole. Unlike all other variations, postmodern post-
Zionism does not present a historical argument for its own emergence – it does
not explain why it appeared and prospered (let alone why is it a positive thing
that it did) at the time that it did.
The “space clearing gesture,” in this case, consists of  acknowledging
the ways and methods in which what is in origin plural, hybrid and unstable is
stabilized, routinized, homogenised and purified. Both coerced and seduced into
the Zionist regime of  the normal, diasporic identity sustaining practices (among
which languages); communal structures; forms of  knowledge and authority;
micro-practices of  resistance and temporary suspension of  oppression; alterna-
tive traditions; and local narratives and ways of  ordering things, disappeared,
demonized and ridiculed. 
Ram however, positions, next to the above, mostly Foucauldian under-
standing of  postmodern post-Zionism, an approach he calls Habermasian or cit-
izenship oriented postmodern post-Zionism. This is Ram’s personal favoured
variation and it is catalogued as postmodern, mostly because of  Ram’s personal
(and idiosyncratic) attachment to this concept. As it was Ram who originally sug-
gested the term post-Zionism in 1993, this appears to also be the reason why,
given the prefix ‘post’, post-Zionism ended up overtly-associated with postmod-
ernism. 
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Premised on Brubaker’s classic distinction between ethnic and territorial
nationalism,19 this framework understands post-Zionism as the attempt to
decouple Israeli nationalism from the Jewish or any other ethnically defined
communal identity. According to Ram: 
This type of  nationalism based on a present common framework of
life, rather than on past myth, may overcome the unresolved tension
between the Jewish component in Israeli identity, which may turn into a
matter of  private or sub-communal affiliation, and the democratic com-
ponent of  Israeli identity, which must turn into the state’s constitutional
basis (Ram, 133).
The fourth post-Zionist approach according to Ram is termed post-
colonial, and understands post-Zionism as part of  the ongoing struggle against
colonialism in all its expressions and manifestations. Zionism is best understood
as a particular expression of  European colonialism – a colonialism of  a special
nature. Post-Zionism as a postcolonial phenomenon aims to uncover and contest
all the ways and sites in which non-Europeans (whether Palestinian or Jews from
Muslim countries) are disempowered, marginalised, discriminated and excluded.
Typologically wise, I think Silberstein is right to catalogue postmodern
and postcolonial post-Zionism together (Silberstein, chapter 6). The similarities
and commonalities between postmodern and postcolonial post-Zionism strike
me as far greater than those Ram seems to find between postmodern post-
Zionism and his own Habermasian post-Zionism, which should in fact consti-
tute a category in its own right.
The space clearing gesture in the case of  post-colonial post-Zionism is
brought by the “return of  the repressed.” The remnants of  the Palestinian past,
though systematically demolished, nevertheless begun haunting the grandchil-
dren of  those who fought in 1948. For example, the abandoned quarter of  Wadi
Salib at the very heart of  Haifa, a unique case of  a major Palestinian neighbor-
hood left in its abandoned state for five decades.20 There was a growing discon-
tent with the aridness of  the Zionist account of  all that was before the establish-
ment of  Israel. The declassification of  documents from 1948, in British and
Israeli archives. Yet, most of  all it was the eruption of  the Intifada (the wide
spread popular revolt of  Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in 1987), which
most Jewish Israelis experienced as surprising and inexplicable. 
Postcolonial post-Zionism, is the most productive approach, especially
from a historiographical perspective since it re-embeds Zionism in wider colonial
phenomena. Pappe, originally identifying himself  with this variation of  post-
Zionism, challenged in his work the existing belief  that Britain opposed the
independence of  Israel and was mobilized, at least partially motivated by the
characteristic anti-Semitism of  its upper class, against Israel. Showing that Britain
was mostly neutral, and when biased, backing the Israeli rather than the
Palestinian side, Pappe stressed the indifference of  Britain to the Nakba. Looked
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at from the perspective of  Britain’s indifference to other, greater and far more
murderous, mass expulsions of  populations taking place in Europe and Asia at
the same time, this should hardly be surprising. 
However, Israel and the Zionist colonisation campaign preceding its
establishment, was not and cannot be understood as merely part of  the British
Empire. Postcolonial post-Zionism’s contribution to the wider field of  postcolo-
nial studies, lies in fact in the way it forces one to disaggregate and further devel-
op the simple categories of  indigenous, settler and empire. Adding the important
category of  refugee, it introduces the dynamic of  refugee populations (first the
Jews, later the Palestinians) whose problem is both framed and (insufficiently)
solved by international organisations  and interested states. The international
decision to solve Europe’s Jewish problem by means of  a Jewish state on part of
Palestine as well as the decision to perpetuate for four generations the Palestinian
refugees problem, is in this regard, part of  colonial history. 
Pappe, however, though fleshing out in his research most of  the above
drama, prefers to revert in the last decade back to classic anti-Zionist frame-
works. Disillusioned by the collapse of  post-Zionism after 2000, Pappe prefers
narrating the story in a way that clearly specifies a victim and a villain (even if  a
complex villain which one can easily identify with). In this regard his story of
post-Zionism is personal, hagiographic when describing the courageous pioneer-
ing efforts of  individuals before the 1980s, and far more political than theoretic
in its guiding passion.
A Postmortem of  the Possibly Dead 
In his 2014 book, The Idea of  Israel: A History, Pappe argues that “more than any-
thing else post-Zionism was a mood […] when it changed as moods do, it could
easily be declared dead, which is what one Israeli journalist declared in Haaretz
in September 2001. Alas at least from the perspective of  this writer [Pappe], it
was. This book is in many ways post-Zionism’s post mortem” (Pappe, 132). 
However, putting forward a proper postmortem of  post-Zionism, that
is an examination of  the dead body so as to ascertain the cause of  the death,
might be a greater task then Pappe allows for in his book. To begin with, is it at
all true that post-Zionism is – to the extent that such metaphoric language is
helpful – dead? 
On the one hand, the historian Shlomo Sand’s 2008 (in Hebrew, 2009
in English) best seller The Invention of  the Jewish People, stirring much public con-
troversy both in Israel and in Europe (and to a lesser extent in North America),
seems to indicate that post-Zionism did not die in 2000.21 The philosophers Adi
Ophir and Ariella Azoulay’s 2008 study The One State Condition and Azoulay’s
2009 photographic history of  the Nakba, failed to attract the attention these
works deserve.22 However, Ophir’s project: the Lexicon for Political Theory,
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launched in 2010, has been a highly productive site of  post-Zionist thinking and
writing, attracting more scholarly and public attention than any other academic
activity in Hebrew during the past five years.23
In late 2014, the Ben Gurion Research Institute for the Study of  Israel
and Zionism published the historian Dafna Hirsch’s comprehensive study ‘We are
Here to Bring the West’ – Hygiene Education and Culture Building in the Jewish Society of
Mandate Palestine.24 Nuanced and critical rather than polemical, Hirsch’s work
exemplifies mature and confident post-Zionist historiography at its best, pub-
lished by one of  the strongholds of  Zionist scholarship. Interestingly, Hirsch
cautioned in a recent interview, that framing Zionism as colonialism is not wrong
as much as it is an oversimplification of  a complex and tellingly convoluted
story.25
On the other hand, post-Zionism did change dramatically after the year
2000. From a triumphant spirit of  the era, sweeping the Humanities and even
more so the Social Sciences faculties in Israeli Academia, post-Zionism became
by the first decade of  the new millennium, a demonized heresy. Post-Zionist dis-
course, previously celebrated as robust and disenchanted, was now widely deni-
grated as flippancy – nothing more than a few privileged intellectuals always talk-
ing as if  the joke about Zionism has already been made. Now however, more
and more people (among which donours) found themselves wondering, why
exactly is it so grotesquely absurd to be a Zionist? 
Ram, acknowledging that post-Zionism has indeed lost its trendy glitter
in the eyes of  those attentive to this particular dimension of  intellectual produc-
tion, nevertheless argues that: 
While in political terms post-Zionism is not at its peak at present, this
is not necessarily the case with regard to the impact of  post-Zionism
on Israeli culture, especially the elite culture. In this regard the talk of
“decline and fall” is in all probability short-sighted. Post-Zionism seems
to have been diffused rather deep into the public consciousness. Hence,
the circumstantial political state of  post-Zionism should not be con-
fused with its structural position (Ram, 126).
For Ram, it is a mistake to judge post-Zionism “in the positivistic terms
of  popular spread or of  political effect” (Ram, 126). Being an emergent counter-
hegemonic trend, post-Zionism’s true achievement according to Ram, is discur-
sive. That is, its achievement is the very creation of  formerly non-existing hori-
zons, positions, options, questions, concepts, and problematisations. Though it
was only for less than a decade that post-Zionism appeared to be on the verge of
dethroning Zionism as Israel’s hegemonic ideology, its very emergence – a previ-
ously non-existent family of  third options transcending the Zionist-anti-Zionist
opposition – cannot be undone. Not so easily in any case.
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Ram’s faith in the irreversibility of  post-Zionism, invites on a certain
level a symptomatic rather than substantive reading. Insisting that what empiri-
cally appears to be dead is in fact immortal and hence only moved to transcen-
dent pastures “in critical theory terms, post-Zionism is a concept of  both imma-
nence – tapping undercurrents; and transcendence – pointing towards an exoge-
nous normative horizon,” (Ram, 126) is an ancient and all too familiar move.
However, one will be wrong to dismiss Ram’s argument as merely typical of  the
aftermath of  intolerable defeats. 
From Ram’s perspective, post-Zionism was never really smug, and
while Silberstein might have misread Pappe, he was nevertheless right in describ-
ing the post-Zionists as those who clear the space. For him, post-Zionism was
never fully dependent on – reducible to – external conditions. Post-Zionism,
though conditioned and constrained by political circumstances was never directly
stirred by them and cannot be exhaustively reduced to them. Post-Zionism as a
scholarly and cultural phenomenon should be conceptualised as having its own
agency and as such only structurally coupled with the political system, both
mutually (though not equally) conditioning and constraining each other.
Unlike Ram, Pappe, who though writing after the publication of  Ram’s
book (the Hebrew version was already published in 2006) does not mention it, 26
thinks that post-Zionism failed in its search for an alternative to Zionism. This
resulted in a return of  most of  those formerly identified as post-Zionists “to the
ideology’s warm embrace” (Pappe, 8); while a few (Pappe among them) either
turned or returned to anti-Zionism. In other words, Pappe sees post-Zionism as
a failed attempt to transcend the Zionist – anti-Zionist opposition by means of
opening up a third possibility. For him, though such an alternative was clearly
and loudly aspired, it never actually materialised. The violently intolerant public
atmosphere in Israel during the 2014 war in Gaza (termed by Israel operation
“Protective Edge”) as well as the bluntly racist and inflammatory rhetoric that
helped Netanyahu win the 2015 elections, appear to further validate Pappe’s ver-
dict. 
Yet, Pappe says with reference to the shift of  political temperament in
Israel since the new millennium: “[t]hus did the pendulum swing from Zionism
to post-Zionism thence to neo-Zionism” (8). This misapplication of  the
metaphor of  a pendulum is, I believe, telling. While describing a swinging pendu-
lum, Pappe is actually speaking of  a movement between three distinct positions
(Zionism, post-Zionism, neo-Zionism), not an oscillation between two positions.
Pappe remains ambivalent and partial to the category of  neo-Zionism, consis-
tently treating it as a return or a re-entrenchment of  Zionism. This in turn begs
the question: why apply the category in the first place? 
And indeed Pappe’s last two chapters (and the epilogue), dedicated to
neo-Zionism, are the least insightful part of  his study. Understandably so, to be
sure, as not enough time has yet passed and Pappe, being a historian, does not
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pretend nor claim to have sufficient perspective on the subject matter. The rela-
tive scarcity of  research on this most recent development in the Israeli ideologi-
cal landscape, renders any scholarly reference to neo-Zionism as merely a pio-
neering gesture.27
The problem is one of  definition: what does one mean exactly by neo-
Zionism? How does neo-Zionism differ from Zionism and why is there at all a
need for such a category? 
While post-Zionism was a term suggested by Ram in a volume he edit-
ed in 1993, Israeli Society: Critical Perspectives,28 and was quickly embraced by post-
Zionists as well as the media, this is not the case with neo-Zionism. The term
was (arguably) coined in 2010 by a key neo-Zionist activist, Ronen Shoval, head
of  the Im Tirtzu NGO, whose ongoing highly effective campaigns against an
alleged post-Zionist hegemony in Israeli academia have significantly affected aca-
demic freedom in Israel.29 However, the term is currently almost exclusively
used by post-Zionists (and to a lesser extent anti-Zionist) critics of  this ideologi-
cal turn. Zionist critics of  neo-Zionism prefer to term it “right-wing post-
Zionism” or “Settlers’ post-Zionism” (Ram, 114). 
As the term neo-Zionism suggests Zionism reconstituted after the
post-Zionist challenge, it seems only attractive to those who have an interest in
framing post-Zionism as meaningful enough so as to justify registering its occur-
rence in the name of  its triumphant opponent. It is in this regard not surprising
that other than post-Zionists, only people like Shoval, who made it his life mis-
sion to salvage Israel from the malignant havoc of  post-Zionism, are in need of
a term such neo-Zionism. And yet, if  one observes the current Israeli ideological
landscape it does seem that for the past two decades there has been an explicit
ideological debate between rather classic Zionist stances and what will qualify as
neo-Zionist ones.30 In many ways, the Zionist – post-Zionist debates of  the
1990s gave way in the twenty-first century to what is essentially a Zionist – neo-
Zionist controversy. 
Ram delineates: “three main historical meta-narratives that compete
over the re-designation of  Israeli identity: the old national meta-narrative; and
the two new counter-meta-narratives of  neo-Zionism—an exclusionary ethno-
nationalist trend; and of  post-Zionism—an inclusionary (but class biased) liberal
trend” (Ram, 4). Arguing that: “[i]n face of  the unresolved strain within main-
stream Zionism (Israel as Jewish and democratic) and the ethnic racism of
Jewish neo-Zionism (Israel as a Jewish state), the concept of  post-Zionism
(Israel as a democratic state) emerged in the 1990s as a democratic liberal alter-
native” (Ram, 112).
In other words, at the heart of  Zionism lies an unresolvable paradox: it
is somehow equally democratic and Jewish. Though a democracy, the right of
self-determination and in fact any practice of  collective rights, is unique to the
Jewish people and denied to Israel’s non-Jewish citizens (let alone the 4 million
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non-citizens), even though they cannot assimilate into the Jewish people. While a
democracy, the state does not promote the interest of  all the populations under
its sovereignty, but only those of  the Jewish people, though only half  of  which
have Israeli citizenship and of  its citizens 20% (and up to 40% of  the entire
population) are not and cannot become Jewish.
Zionism denies that this is a paradox, or in any case that it is an unsus-
tainable one. Post-Zionism points out this paradox and demands that the state
will become a democracy, subjecting its Jewish nature to the precepts of  demo-
cratic rule. Neo-Zionism points out this paradox and demands that the state will
be first Jewish and only then democratic.
However, from the Zionist perspective, both the neo-Zionists and the
post-Zionists see the current situation as unsustainable and absurd. Neo-
Zionism is not shattered by the revelations of  post-Zionist historical research, it
is in fact premised on embracing them, though not at all in the way hoped for
and envision by the post Zionists.
In 2004, the Historian Benny Morris, publishing a second and exten-
sively updated edition of  his seminal work, which in many ways inaugurated
post-Zionism, The Birth of  the Palestinian Refugee Problem (the first edition pub-
lished in 1988). The original edition suggested that most of  the transgressions
against Palestinian civilians as well as the expulsion of  Palestinian populations
during the war emerged from local conditions and initiatives, mostly unknown to
(let alone premeditated by) the central high command and leadership. In the sec-
ond 2004 edition however, Morris corrected this prior picture, pointing out
greater involvement of  the leadership in the expulsions that were now suggested
as more extensive, systematic and to some extent even premeditated. Morris also
argued that various Palestinian leaders did encourage certain populations to flee,
promising their return once the Zionist forces are defeated.31
On the occasion of  the publication of  the new edition, Morris, in a
widely read and discussed interview, argued that the vast uprooting and expul-
sion of  Palestinian populations during the war was necessary for the establish-
ment of  a Jewish state. More so, in his opinion, Ben Gurion should have used
the (presumably unrepeatable) opportunity to cleanse the entire territory – from
the river Jordan to the Mediterranean – and stabilize the state of  Israel for gen-
erations.32
Morris, in systematically unearthing the facts of  the uprooting and
expulsion of  the Palestinian populations in 1948 only to pronounce it not only
necessary but also unfortunately partial, embodied the neo-Zionist turn. Unlike
the original Zionist position in which the Nakba was originally denied and its
remnants actively erased, or the contemporary Zionist hesitant attempts to deny
Israeli responsibility to the matter without denying its occurrence, Morris sug-
gests a bluntly unapologetic approach.33
Morris’ specific version of  neo-Zionism may be interpreted as an
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inversed version of  the post-Zionist framework Ram termed post-Ideological.
Instead of  renegotiating the boundaries and identity of  the nation by means of
owning up, apologizing and compensating, past transgressions, Morris calls on
the Israeli public acknowledge what has happened but without empathy or
remorse. The renegotiated nation preferred by Morris is not multi-ethnic (it is
multi-cultural with regard to the various Jewish cultures) but mono-ethnic. Its
boundaries and identity are indeed renegotiated by means of  coming to terms
with the nation’s history, for example the regretful reluctance to cleanse the
entire land of  Israel in 1948. 
However, there are other noteworthy variations of  neo-Zionism. For
example the Shalem Center – a private neo-conservative think tank and academic
press that recently opened the first private Israeli liberal arts college – has devel-
oped and disseminated since its foundation in 1994, a myth cultivating and
affirming the approach. Following the philosophy of  Leo Strauss, the mythical
foundation of  the political community is regarded as unavoidable and necessary.
The practice of  debunking national myths – the heart of  post-Zionist scholar-
ship – should hence be regarded as both trivial and unacceptably harmful. More
so, the debunking of  national myths would never lead in some subsequent stage
to a grounding of  the political community in historical truth, which is both unat-
tainable and unsuitable for the purpose. The creation of  new national myths
would soon turn out to be unavoidable. Given so, this type of  neo-Zionism, sug-
gest embracing and cultivating national myths rather than slaying holy cows.
In 2009, (the English translation was published in 2011,) the historian
Boaz Neumann published what is probably the best example of  this type of
neo-Zionist historiography. The book, titled Land and desire in early Zionism,34
attempts to reconstructs the language and imagery of  Zionist pioneers, carefully
imitating them so as to speak from within their emotionally flooded experience.
The group studied was in reality a small minority and has been already grossly
over-represented and mythologized in Zionist historiography. Neumann’s depic-
tion of  their life as continuously bordering on the verge of  ecstasy, is rather
unlikely and is based on the fact that they tended to use poetic hyperbolic lan-
guage in their letters and memoirs. However, Neumann is not trying to write a
social history of  Jewish colonisation in Palestine at the early decades of  the
twentieth century. His book revamps the Zionist pioneering myth by means of
reconstructing their myth making voice – their experience in the moments when
they happened to actually be enchanted, rather than disenchanted and bitter. 
Conclusion
In view of  the publication of  two comprehensive histories of  the post-Zionist
movement in Israel during the 1990s, by two of  the leading scholars associated
with post-Zionism, the historian Ilan Pappe and the sociologist Uri Ram, I tried
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in this article to outline what is – or in my opinion should be – at stake in writ-
ing such a history. Reading Ram’s and Pappe’s studies against the background of
Silberstein 1999 study, which up until now was the best available source in
English for those interested in post-Zionism, I reviewed the different post-
Zionist approaches or frameworks. 
I argued that the category of  neo-Zionism, which both Pappe and Ram
suggest as the current ideological mood in Jewish Israeli society, should be better
distinguished from classic Zionism. Pappe seems to actually think that there is
no meaningful difference between Zionism and neo-Zionism, albeit the chrono-
logical fact that neo-Zionism came after the demise of  the post-Zionist chal-
lenge, which he believed (and with good reason) failed. However, his use of  the
category then appears questionable. Ram on the other hand clearly distinguishes
between neo-Zionism and Zionism, which is in his case less of  a challenge given
that he argues that post-Zionism, though defeated in terms of  political and pop-
ular adherence, did restructure Israeli discourse in an irreversible way. However, I
argued that Ram fails to convince that neo-Zionism is not in fact part of  the
post-Zionist family at its core. Seen from the Zionist perspective, both ideologi-
cal developments reject the basic Zionist premise of  a Jewish-democratic state,
though the post-Zionist advocate subjecting the Jewish element to the democrat-
ic nature of  the state while the neo-Zionist appear to actually currently succeed
in subjecting the state’s democratic pretenses to its Jewish nature. 
By acknowledging that neo-Zionism is part of  the post-Zionist turn,
we would be able to better analyze the nature of  the ideological transformations
in Israeli Society since the late 1980s. The de-nationalization that was what we
commonly call post-Zionism was followed by a re-nationalization in the form of
neo-Zionism. Given the high hopes for the emergence of  an inclusive and multi-
cultural democracy in Israel, during the 1990s, the frustration and despair of
Pappe and Ram in view of  neo-Zionism are understandable. This however does
not mean that post-Zionism failed, only that it did not lead to what they hoped
it would. 
I suggested borrowing the terms de-nationalization and re-nationaliza-
tion from the South African context. I believe that the demise of  Afrikaner
nationalism and the subsequent re-nationalization process, in the form of  an
African nationalism, though very different and far less disappointing (though
nevertheless still disappointing) follow a similar pattern to that of  the rise and
alleged fall of  post-Zionism in Israel. It seems to me that we should now turn to
study the intellectual history of  post-Zionism comparatively as one particular
example of  a far more general pattern of  de-nationalization and re-nationaliza-
tion.
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